The traditional double-blind peer review process currently used to determine which articles are published in scientific journals is far from perfect. This article argues that the Internet can provide us with a better way to judge article quality using the opinion of every reader rather than that of only a couple of reviewers. The article offers a relatively simple business model that can provide funding for such a publishing system. The model contains three basic components, a reviewing component, a submission/cost component, and a distribution component, The reviewing component will be an electronic market through which quality feedback can be bought and sold. The submission/cost component will decide if an article should be published and distributed electronically on-line using volume forecasts by experienced forecasters who will be compensated according to the accuracy of their forecasts. Articles can be bought by anyone in the scientific or general community from the distribution component. Although not perfect, our proposal does possess many features that could be valuable to the scientific community.
Problems with the current peer review system
It is easy to see that a reviewer's evaluation of an article's quality will be biased due to conflict of interest if authors and reviewers know each other. To mitigate this conflict about 350 years ago scientists introduced the double-blind peer review process -neither the author(s) nor the reviewer(s) of an article have access to each other's identity. However when the article reviewed supports the reviewer's prior research its evaluation will be higher on average and vice versa, so the conflict of interest is still not completely eliminated. Moreover, Statistics tells us that the personal opinions of several randomly selected reviewers cannot be a very good predictor of the value of the article to the whole scientific community (see The Economist, 1996 and Starbuck, 2004) . It becomes clear that to improve the review process we need to pick reviewers whose opinions are forwardlooking and highly representative of those held by the general community. We also need to compensate somehow quick, accurate and constructive reviewers. Currently the complex task of picking and rewarding reviewers is assigned to the journal editors. Since rewards are granted by the editor, reviewers have an incentive to provide a review that matches the editor's expectations. This means that a good review requires that the editor be also forward-looking and highly representative of the general community. Reviewers, editors, and the scientific community as a whole face a challenging task in this regard. Scientific rigor requires time. The judgment of whether a certain theory is right or wrong is not easy.
It often takes years to establish the validity of a newly proposed theory. To solve the problem of quality uncertainty most universities try to estimate the prestige of the journal in which an article appears as a rough measure of an article's quality. The prestige of a journal is usually evaluated through surveys or through the ISI impact factor 1 . However, these measures are not necessarily accurate because, even within a journal, article quality can vary widely. The most recent journal ranking study by Lowry et. al. (2004) is based on a survey of 2559 faculty from the US and abroad. Rankings based on surveys are subjective, vary through time, and can be misleading (Chua, et al. 2002) . While there are several methods for measuring citations that can reflect the quality of a journal including the ISI impact factor (see Katerattanakul et al. 2003) , tracking the number of times a specific article is cited is another attempt to obtain indirect measures of article quality.
Individual article citations are not perfect because they are not quality controlled. Authors, who have friends and colleagues that also publish articles, might be able to cite each other's work as a professional or personal favor, so conflict of interest is still present.
Therefore currently there is still no consistent way of evaluating an article even after the article is published.
Several scientists have suggested that the article publication process be purely democratic and the final quality judgment be left in the hand of all readers (see Nadasdy, 1997 , Rogers and Hurt, 1990 , Stodolsky, 1990 , and Varian, 1998 . According to some of these articles, double-blind peer review should be abolished completely and everyone should be allowed to publish his/her article online. The readers would then determine the quality after reading the available articles. An interesting alternative is described by Mizzaro (2003) . He proposes a system in which all authors, readers, and papers receive a quality score and a steadiness score. We think that the Internet gives the ability to radically improve the article publication and distribution process. Using the Internet, we can lift some of the burden off of the editors' shoulders. We should ask reviewers to review articles for impact (expected number of downloads) and then let all readers evaluate their quality. This should be helpful because different people might have different criteria for quality. We can pick and reward quick, accurate and constructive reviewers. We might be able to use the Internet to help authors write, proofread, and submit their articles. The Internet has challenged the doubleblind peer review model already anyway. Using Google or SSRN, a reviewer can sometimes find a working paper similar to the one that she is reviewing and discover who the author is.
Our proposal
Based on the idea that the Internet can provide cheap and easy access to a huge number of articles, we propose the creation of a digital science library. This library would be part of a system which would give every reader the opportunity to rate an article's quality. The system would also provide financial incentives for authors to produce higher quality articles, for reviewers to give constructive feedback, and for forecasters (discussed below)
to submit accurate forecasts. We offer a relatively simple business model that can provide funding for such a system. The system has three basic components: a reviewing component, a submission component, and a distribution component. These components'
functions are shown in Figure 1 . Essentially our system is similar to the one proposed by Mizzaro (2003) except it can provide multiple scores for various aspects of article quality and it uses market forces to guarantee financial sustainability. A description of the three components follows.
Figure 1. A diagram of the new scientific digital library

Review component
The reviewing component will represent a forum in which authors can solicit feedback from various kinds of reviewers. Reviews can be purchased from any of the registered reviewers. The price of the review will be a result of the bargaining process between authors and reviewers. The reviewers' role in this market will be to offer constructive suggestions for improving the quality of an article. Traditionally reviewers have volunteered their time as a service to the academic community. With this system, reviewers will be directly rewarded for their efforts. For the reviewer who feels a sense of commitment, monetary compensation might not be a motivating factor; however, it should not negatively impact the evaluation process. The compensation can be viewed as a bonus or a thank-you; it can even be donated to an institution or returned to the system. Generally Chang & Ching-Chang (2001) have already shown that it is worthwhile to compensate reviewers for their effort and some journals do that already. Another motivating factor will be that data on individual reviewers will be kept and displayed. This data can be used to create "best reviewer" lists and can serve to enhance individual reputation and status in the community. Services for editing papers could also be offered.
Submission component
An essential part of the proposed electronic publication system is its submission module.
All members of the system have online profiles including affiliations and subject area interests. The process starts with articles being submitted for evaluation by the author. The system, along with its market mechanism, plays the role of an editor. Once the article is submitted for evaluation, the system distributes the article to a special category of reviewers, which we will call forecasters hereon. After the forecasters submit their article download volume predictions, the market mechanism selects articles for acceptance or rejection.
Every article submission is accompanied by a submission fee and must contain a collection of valid subject headings. A valid subject heading is one which is listed as an area of interest by at least three forecasters in their online profile. An author can also propose an additional previously unavailable subject heading, which can be validated after seven members add it to their profile or express a willingness to evaluate the article.
The publication decision is made with the help of another type of reviewer, whom we call the forecaster. After reading an article, the forecaster has to predict the expected download volume of the article. Every forecaster will be compensated by the author of the article later in proportion to the accuracy of his/her prediction. The system takes into consideration the forecasts of several forecasters and estimates the expected profit from the article. If the expected profit is negative and the author still wants to publish the article, he/she has to pay to cover the publishing costs. A fixed payment of a similar sort is not completely alien to some current journals (e.g. American Economic Review). An article with a bid of $0 can still be published given that it can generate enough revenue to cover its costs and the appropriate compensation.
After an article has been successfully submitted, the system compiles a list of all forecasters who are suitable to read it. Forecasters will compete for a portion of the bid.
Experimental market literature suggests that having more than five participants in a market drastically reduces the likelihood of cooperative gaming (Ketcham, Smith, and Williams, 1984) . For this reason, seven forecasters for each article will be picked by the system. If more than seven members are highly suitable, members who are currently in process of reading an article are not eligible. The system will randomly distribute the article to any seven of the remaining suitable forecasters. Forecaster suitability is determined by the number of matches between the subject areas of the article and the subject areas residing in the electronic profile of a forecaster. Only the first three forecasters to complete an evaluation report will be eligible for a monetary compensation from the author so that forecast speed is encouraged.
Distribution component
An important final feature of the system is a reader feedback mechanism similar to the one proposed by Mizzaro (2003) . Any time after a reader downloads an article, s/he will be allowed to post reviews, feedback, opinions, judgments or comments. Users will also be allowed to score numerically the quality of the article as they perceive it. This will provide future potential readers with additional data to make a download decision. It will also provide a place for the community to see what others think about an article. This will potentially start dialogs that will evolve into intellectual debate and ultimately, quality research; much like peer commentary (Harnad, 1979) . It will be easy to track the usage impact of an article much earlier by counting article downloads (Pernbeger, 2004; Hitchcock, et al. 2002) . A similar attempt to track article usage has been recently demonstrated by Lawrence Brown. He uses download statistics from the Social Science
Research Network to evaluate article quality (Brown, 2003) . The distribution module can use the quality feedback from a user to suggest articles in which the user might be interested. This will provide an incentive for all users to express their opinion truthfully.
Economists view product evaluations of the kind described above as public goods which are usually underprovided in a purely market setting. If the customization option is not enough of an incentive for quality feedback, the distribution module can use an efficient, computer-based mechanism to provide incentives as described in Avery et. al. (1999), however, this will make the forecasters' task much harder.
The system we propose does not rely on consistent government funding. It might even generate grant or research funding opportunities due to the much lower cost of electronic publishing. The system provides some additional benefits that show up clearly during the distribution process. The reengineered review process described above is also directly linked to the article distribution process. Articles are available for download from a central site immediately after the market mechanism accepts them. The pay-per-article model as described and tested in PEAK at the University of Michigan is the one we consider most suitable for the distribution of scientific articles (MacKie-Mason et al. 1999 ). Under this model every user paid the same fee per article in order to read it. The current Apple service iTunes sells information goods (songs) using the same principle (Taylor, 2003) . Since all publications will be available in an electronic format over the Internet, it will be easy to introduce a system in which consumers are charged by the article. We propose a few operational modifications that will enhance its performance. The user will be charged only once a fee of F if he or she would like to read the full article. All articles will be available at the same download fee F. A download is recorded the first time an individual downloads an article. Re-downloading has no effect on volume calculations and is not a monetary transaction.
The articles will not be organized by journals (since journals need not exist) but only by subject areas. In addition to subject area, keyword, or standard text searches, other data can be used to filter articles. An additional feature of the system is the capability of each user to search for or create custom bundles of articles by subject area, by predicted or realized volume, by author, or by other criteria. These bundles can be e-mailed directly to the "subscribers" of the system or can be available online on a personalized web page. For example, a subscriber can request to receive abstracts via email when any article is published with a keyword of "B2B markets" and a volume estimate greater than 500 or any article in the IS field for which the author paid less than $5.
Clearly the system cannot be introduced in practice without some guidance to its users. There should be an introductory period during which reviewers will not be held liable for their errors and bids will be open and adjustable. The system can also be operated in parallel with current practices. After the system is completely in place, "traditional" journals can cease to exist in their current form. Bundles will be created in a decentralized way by the users of the system and not by editorial boards.
The proposed system will also provide some additional advantages to the scientific community. For example, article research quality can be easily compared across
disciplines. An Experimental Economics article's volume could be compared to an Experimental Physics article's volume easily if one considers their relative volume rank in the given subject. As mentioned earlier universities use various methods to measure a professor's research capabilities. The relative volume download, for example, works as a good estimate of quality across disciplines. The reader feedback mechanism can be examined to provide qualitative quality judgments. Citation data will also be available as another quantitative proxy for article quality. The system recognizes that different institutions prefer different measurements of quality. All the data will be available for various decision-making groups to choose between or weigh as their policies so dictate.
Another potential benefit is having one central location for storing, quickly accessing, and assessing the quality of articles, which creates the potential for a network effect. With the entire scientific community meeting online, leaving feedback, and discussing ideas, the quality and quantity of articles should increase.
When discussing similar online systems it is important to see if there are strong incentives to violate copyright law. As usual, when an article is accepted for publication, the system owns it's copyright. If the price per article (F) is too high, users of the system might have an incentive to make copies of the article and distribute them accordingly. One way to solve the problem is for the system to check if the author of an article has lawfully obtained all the works cited in it. This can be done automatically before the article is given to the forecasters (assuming that articles are only available in this system).
Limitations
The system we propose is not ideal. Streamlining the process of scientific publications will be controversial because the interests of many different parties are at stake. Following is a discussion of some of the disadvantages of the new system. They are also shown in Table 1 .
Since there is much uncertainty surrounding article quality and it usually takes the author a long time to find an appropriate venue for the article to be published, some authors decide to "target" certain journals in advance to save time. Targeting journals will not be necessary under the new system. As long as the article subject headings are stated correctly the system will be able to find the best matching reviewers for a submitted article.
However, scientists who find the strategy of targeting journals valuable might be negatively affected.
Journals will not be able to serve as brand names but we think that it is more important to search directly for an article rather than rely on the journal brand to provide you with the articles one needs. If readers are allowed to customize the kind of articles they receive, then every reader will be able to identify one's own brand. It is true that society journals reflect the thinking of members a natural community of scholars. The proposed system will encourage post-publication comments from readers and will thus still allow formation of natural communities of scholars. A major current concern is that the tenure track committees at many universities do not consider publications in electronic journals comparable in quality to publications in traditional paper-based journals (Snyder, 2001) . We hope that attitudes have changed during the past four years, otherwise this could be a drawback.
Doing away with the traditional editor role can also be considered a disadvantage of the system because the change is expected to generate much opposition. Many members of the scientific community still think that the editor can perform well the hard task of selecting articles for publication and in matching articles with appropriate reviewers. We do need some research in this area to estimate the trade-offs involved.
It might be the case that the proposed system undermines niche research areas by making it expensive to publish articles that are of interest to a small number of researchers. This problem could be addressed by scientific institutions that provide research grants. It is now common practice to include a budget line within a grant that is used to cover expenses related to publication. As costs related to electronic publishing decrease we expect this problem to disappear gradually.
There are many issues related to the new system's implementation that need to be considered and should be mentioned as limitations. It might be hard during the new system's introductory period for forecasters to find a reliable way to estimate an article's download volume. The proposed system could be introduced in such a way as to provide guidelines to forecasters when they are trying to estimate the download volume of an article. Some forecasters will excel in that aspect and others will be not that good. With the flow of time forecasters will have enough experience to rely on when providing an estimate. Authors should always try to produce a paper that attempts to maximize the quality proxy used by their respective universities. We have not discussed issues of security and privacy that are important to any online system containing personal information, as well as unique login names and passwords. We leave this to future research efforts.
The new digital scientific library will undoubtedly require some fine-tuning. For example, we need to find out how much time the volume forecast should reasonably cover and how many forecasters should be used to estimate the expected profit. Longer time spans and more forecasters will guarantee higher accuracy but will also necessitate a longer waiting time before publication and, most likely, a higher charge to the author on average.
We envision the system being run by a non-profit foundation like the NSF. The system is designed to cover its expenses, so potentially a search engine devoted to searching scholarly articles (like Google Scholar) might be a good private alternative. The options are virtually limitless but a careful exploration of the possibilities that technology offers can show us a better way to gather, store, evaluate, spread, and produce scientific knowledge.
Conclusion
The paper describes the most important features of an electronic system for review and distribution of scientific articles that is based on simple market principles. The system makes sure that the electronic publication process is financially sustainable and provides financial incentives to forecasters to provide correct estimates of an article's download volume. In addition the system provides a forum where authors can solicit constructive reviews and experienced reviewers can offer their services. The system should dramatically decrease the time between article submission and article publication because it also provides monetary incentives to forecasters and reviewers to be expedient. In addition, the proposed system delivers many numerical statistics including total download volume, download volume by scientific users, relative download volume, citation counts, and user ratings that could be used by universities and other agencies as proxies for article quality.
The system can also provide article, author, reviewer, and forecaster rankings across disciplines, a simple procedure to provide an outlet for new areas of research, and a mechanism to prevent copyright violations. Future research can focus on the procedures that will lead to a smooth transition from the current system to the new one. Although the financial incentives under the new system are aligned well with its goals they might still not be enough to completely eliminate all potential conflicts of interest. In any case, however, improvement over the current process should be quite visible.
